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29 May 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Uruguay-Cuba: The Uruguayan Government has announced that banking arrangements for a trade agreement have been worked out with the Cuban trade mission now in Montevideo.

Uruguay reportedly will exchange rice, livestock, and other agricultural products for Cuban sugar, tobacco, and cacao.

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Should Uruguay accept the sugar offer, almost its entire yearly import needs would be supplied by Cuba. Domestic consumption amounts to approximately 105,000 metric tons per year. Of that amount, roughly one half is locally produced and the other half is imported, usually from Brazil and Argentina.

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DAILY BRIEF

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*Argentina: The Peronists have surprised and distressed other members of the seven-party electoral front by announcing that their Popular Union (UP) party will support Vicente Solano Lima and Sylvestre Bagnis as front candidates for president and vice president in the July elections.

By Solano Lima's own testimony, several other contenders for the front nomination could attract more support. He told the American Embassy on 27 April that he was disqualified as a candidate because of his friendship for Peron, which he did not try to hide. His Popular Conservative Party is small.

Peron ordered the UP decision, which has reportedly been endorsed by former President Frondizi.

Bagnis is also a candidate for vice president on his Intransigent Radical party slate, headed by Oscar Alende. The UP proposal could cause a split between the Frondizi and Alende factions, although Alende has not thus far lined up alternative electoral cooperation outside of his party.

Some observers consider the UP announcement a trial balloon, and a front slate is still open to further negotiation. In the case of the presidential race, only electors, not candidates, had to be inscribed by 24 May. Any person meeting the constitutional requirement for president may be selected by the electoral college.

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Pakistan-Afghanistan: The resumption of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, announced on 28 May after a 21-month break, should strengthen the new regime in Kabul and help it to return to a more balanced "neutral" position between the West and the bloc.

Even though relations have been restored substantially on Afghanistan's terms, the Kabul government will have to cope with some hostile reaction from die-hard supporters of former Premier Daud's campaign for self-determination of Pashtoon tribes living in Pakistan. Afghan commercial circles will welcome the reopening of the Pakistani access route to free world markets.


With an improvement in Pakistani-Afghan relations, Kabul will have less need to channel badly needed resources into its military establishment, which is being trained and equipped by the USSR. Kabul probably will avoid any abrupt action which might undermine its good relations with Moscow, however.

The fall of the Pakistan-baiting Daud regime in March had removed a major obstacle to the restoration of relations. Pakistan will probably point to the agreement as proof of its flexibility in negotiating regional disputes, in contrast to India's obstruction of progress in the Kashmir dispute.

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29 May 63 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

NOTES

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Cuba - Haiti - Dominican Republic: Cuban Foreign Minister Roa said in early May that the Castro regime was neither interested nor involved in the "comic opera antics" of Dominican President Bosch and Haitian President Duvalier.

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If so, Castro would probably rebuff any overtures by Duvalier at this time for economic or other assistance.)

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South Korea: A new crisis impends. Opponents of former security chief Kim Chong-pil, angered because junta leader Pak Chong-hui has indicated that he would accept the presidential nomination of the Democratic-Republican Party controlled by Kim's political apparatus, are threatening a showdown.

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Malaya-Indonesia: Malayan Prime Minister Rahman has accepted Sukarno's invitation to meet him in Tokyo on 30 May to discuss the proposed Federation of Malaysia. A tripartite ministerial conference with the Philippines is tentatively scheduled for 7 June. Indonesia is attempting to frustrate the formation of Malaysia both by such diplomatic maneuvers and by continued support of anti-Malaysian elements in the Borneo territories.

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
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Kenya: The overwhelming general election victory of Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya African National Union (KANU) ensures that London will face gradually increasing pressure for constitutional changes before granting independence by early 1964. As prime minister, Kenyatta will press KANU's demands for a strong centralized government to modify the present complex federal structure.

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